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endowment and issue the remainder for free to a representative firm. Each country’s regulator has 
a double mandate consisting of obtaining tax and auction revenue without increasing firm’s costs 
too much. Energy may be subsidized or taxed depending on the relative weight of the two 
objectives. We show how equilibrium taxes depend on the proportion of permits which is 
auctioned, on the total amount of permits in the market, on the allocation of permits across 
countries and on the number of participating countries. We also show how the creation of the 
market in a previously unregulated world changes energy taxation. Finally, we highlight that, 
despite the permit market being perfectly competitive, it does not achieve emission abatement in a 
cost-efficient way. 
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1 Introduction
A permit price of 30$ per ton of carbon dioxide roughly doubles the price of coal for
the industry. Managing the cost borne by the firms constitutes a major concern for
national governments when it comes to fiscal decisions regarding energy. Anecdotical
evidence supports how topical was this policy issue with the implementation of the
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). For example, such a concern
was behind Sweden and Denmark’s July 2006 appeals to the European Commission
for permission to cut their existing carbon taxes on the trading sector. After the
implementation of the EU-ETS, those countries considered the co-existence of pre-
existing carbon and energy taxes with emissions trading as double taxation which
could jeopardize their competitiveness. This should come as not surprise given the
documented fact that countries set their environmental policy strategically (Kellen-
berg, 2009, Fredrikkson and Millimet, 2002, Fredriksson et al., 2004).
Many countries are used to subsidizing energy production or consumption. For
example, the OECD survey on Environmentally Harmful Subsidies (OECD, 2005)
reports calculations made by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration (EIA). In 1999, the subsidies to the primary energy sector in the
United States (based only on budgetary expenditures) amount to nearly USD 4 billion.
Yet, energy taxes represent a non-negligible source of revenue for most countries. As
of 2010, energy tax revenue amounted to 4.7% of the total tax revenue on average, for
the EU-27, ranging from 2.8% in Norway to 9.4% in Bulgaria, according to Eurostat.
They also account for a considerable share of total energy costs: in 2005, the share of
taxes in oil prices borne by the industry was 4.3% in Belgium, 4.8% in Japan, 4.9% in
the United States, 13.6% in Germany, 20.3% in the UK and 46.2% in Italy.1. While
international cooperation on such taxes has so far failed on the political arena, major
steps have been taken with the joint implementation of tradable emission permits
(TEPs) international markets. On the one hand, a worldwide market for greenhouse
gases under the Kyoto protocol came into force in February 2004. On the other
hand, the EU-ETS organizes trading for permits on carbon dioxide emissions among
industrial firms within the EU since January 2005. Countries are thus cooperating
on these markets while at the same time they remain responsible for taxes on energy
fuels, the main source of carbon dioxide emissions. Since energy taxes fall on polluting
firms – the players in these international markets – we may expect energy taxes to
have an impact on the TEP equilibrium price. As a consequence, countries may
strategically manipulate energy taxation as a means to minor the costs borne by
their domestic firms.
Figure 1 shows the recent evolution of average energy taxes in the EU, together
with the total pollution permits traded in the EU-ETS market. This preliminary
evidence suggests that the market size has an impact on the tax level. The objective
of this paper is to provide a simple tax competition model that offers an explanation
for this fact.
1Source: International Energy Agency, 2005.
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Figure 1: Energy Taxes and Tradable Permits in the EU
We consider firms which burn fossils fuels for production and thus emit carbon
dioxide. These emissions are regulated by a competitive international market for
tradable permits. A proportion of the permits is freely given to the firms, while
the remaining are auctioned by the governments. Energy taxes levied on fuel con-
sumption are under the jurisdiction of national regulators, whose mandate combines
firms’ costs, energy tax revenue, and TEP-auction revenue. We distinguish between
regulators which attach more weight to the former, or to the latter. We call them,
respectively, firm-oriented and revenue-oriented regulators. Our analysis allows us
to identify the externalities that a country’s tax choice imposes upon the remaining
countries via its impact on the TEP-market equilibrium.2 Firstly, the tax base of
other countries varies because the cost of energy changes, the so-called fiscal exter-
nality. Secondly, the net payments from national to foreign firms also change because
the TEP price varies, the so-called pecuniary externality. We also highlight three
effects which drive the strategic interaction amongst countries. We show that the
higher the energy consumption, the higher the country’s incentive to tax (tax base
affect ); if national firms’ TEP demand is very responsive to the energy cost, taxation
is discouraged (permit-leakage effect); finally, taxation is influenced by the net posi-
tion of the country on the market for permits and by its market power (terms of trade
effect). The combination of these effects allows us to understand how the design of
market for permits affects equilibrium taxes. We pay attention to three issues: the
total amount of permits issued in the market, the distribution of these permits among
2Our model shares this feature with other tax competition setups. A comprehensive survey is
provided by Wilson, 1999.
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the countries (countries’ endowment), the number of countries involved in the mar-
ket, and the introduction of a TEP-market in a previously unregulated world. Our
analysis confirms the result obtained by Santore et al. (2001) that the international
market for tradable permits does not lead to the minimization of total emission abate-
ment costs. This contradicts the usual textbook wisdom and is due to the unequal
Nash equilibrium tax rates which result from country heterogeneity (itself the result
of firm asymmetry). Furthermore, we show that market outcome (and in particular
the permit price) depends on whether the permits are grandfathered or auctioned.
Since the pioneering works of Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972) the literature
on tradable permits has followed many directions, some of them related to our subject
of concern.3 The interplay between distortive taxation and optimal environmental
policy has been popularized under the (sometimes fuzzy) concept of double dividend.
Goulder (1995) provides an authoritative taxonomy of this concept. Much progress
in our understanding of this interaction has occurred. In particular, Babiker et al.
(2003) use a CGE model to show that the interplay between carbon policies and
pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries, depending on the levels of
prior distortive taxes in an economy. Notably, they argue that climate policies under
consideration will likely not provide a weak double dividend in a number of European
countries. The fact that actual TEP markets diverge from the standard textbook
has been addressed recently by Babiker et al. (2004), who emphasize the fact that
the gains from trade can be outweighed by secondary costs associated with prior tax
distortions and market imperfections, providing an illustration with the CGE model
EPPA. In the same spirit, Copeland and Taylor (2005) use an international trade
setting to show that the gains from trade can be ruined by terms of trade effects.
This strand of literature, however, ignores the fact that country-level policies may
react to the implementation of international climate policies.
The idea that country-level regulation may strategically interact with the market
for TEPs has been little discussed in the literature, or it has been addressed in
indirect and implicit ways (see Cropper and Oates (1992), Coggins and Swinton
(1996), Bui, 1998).4 There are some notable exceptions. The first, by Santore et al.
(2001), examine the strategic behavior of state-level utility regulators in the context
of the US federal trading system on sulfur oxide emissions. State-level regulators
act independently of the federal authority by imposing pollution penalties on their
own utilities, hence leading to an emissions trading scheme which is not cost-efficient.
The second is an analysis of energy taxation and a TEP-market in a two-sector
economy, by Eichner and Pethig (2009). The non-tradable sector’s emission target is
attained with tax regulation, while the tradable sector participates in the international
TEP-market and may also be subject to energy taxation (tax rates may differ across
sectors). This paper also shows the inefficiency of energy taxation (in the tradable
3The literature comparing the merits of policy instruments (prices versus quantities) is beyond
the scope of our analysis. We do not compare instruments, we analyze the implications of adding a
new instrument (tradable permits) on pre-existing ones (energy and carbon taxes).
4For example, Oates’s book (2004) on environmental policy and fiscal federalism disregards this
issue.
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sector). In addition, they show that a permit-importing country has an incentive to
tax, while a permit-exporting one faces a disincentive, a result which we also obtain
in our setting. A more recent contribution by the same authors (Eichner and Pethig,
2010) models the interaction between international emissions trading and national
green energy promotion policies. The finding that strategic energy taxation leads to
cost-inefficient abatement has also been obtained by Hoel (2005) in a setup where
international trade leads countries to set energy taxes which are not uniform across
production sectors.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets out the
model and preliminary results regarding the TEP-market and the main forces driving
strategic tax setting. The effects of the total number of TEPs and the number of
participating countries in equilibrium taxation are analyzed in Section 4, while section
5 is devoted to the comparison with autarky. We analyze the effect of firms’ TEP-
endowment and discuss how it can influence the efficiency of the TEP-market in
section 6. Section 7 concludes. All the results are proved in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an economy composed of N countries where a global pollutant is reg-
ulated by an international market for tradable emission permits (TEP). Hence, our
setting parallels the EU-ETS market. In addition, each country is responsible for its
own national energy tax.
2.1 The firms
Each country, indexed by c, hosts a representative firm.5 We consider cost minimizing
firms which use a polluting input denoted by ec (typically, fossil fuels). The production
cost is c(ec), where ec is the energy consumed by the firm in country c; we naturally
assume that it is more costly to produce consuming less energy, i.e., c′(ec) < 0, In
addition, the firms bear an increasing cost to further decrease energy consumption:
c′′(ec) > 0. By normalization, we assume that one unit of energy consumption yields
one unit of pollution emission, which in turn corresponds to one polluting permit.6
Firms take the price of energy, normalized to 1, as given. In the absence of regulation,
the firm chooses a pollution level eo such that −c′(eo) = 1. In order to abate pollution
below this unregulated level, the firm bears an abatement cost C(ec) = c(ec)− c(eo),
respecting C ′(ec) < 0 < C ′′(ec).
Pollution is regulated with an international market for tradable emission permits
(TEP) in which each firm is a price-taker.7 We denote the price of permits by ρ. In
5The analysis would be unchanged if we supposed a continuum of price-taking firms in each
country; see Bre´chet and Peralta (2007) for such an analysis.
6For example, carbon dioxide emissions are strictly proportional to the carbon content of the
fuels.
7This is natural assumption, since the EU-ETS market covers more than 14,000 installations over
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addition, countries charge a unit energy tax tc. Hence, the regulated cost of energy in
country c is given by pc = 1 + tc + ρ.
The market for permits works as follows. The participating countries agree on a
global amount of permits E¯ and on a way to split it amongst countries. The amount of
emission permits in country c is denoted by e¯c. Each country then issues a proportion
α ∈ (0, 1) of these permits to the firms for free and auctions the remaining part, (1−α).
Our parameter α thus measures the share of permits that are grandfathered.8 In each
country the representative firm thus faces the following cost minimization problem
min
ec
tcec + ρ(ec − αe¯c) + C(ec).
Hence, ec(pc) is implicitly given by the first-order condition
−C ′(ec) = 1 + ρ+ tc = pc, (1)
and we have that
dec
dpc
= e′c = −
1
C ′′(ec)
< 0, (2)
hence, when the cost of energy increases, the firm pollutes less. We make two further
assumptions on the demand for permits. Firstly, we assume that the demand is
(weakly) convex, that is,
d2ec
dp2c
≥ 0
This assumption corresponds to the intuitive property that, as the regulated price
of emissions increases, emissions decrease, but at a decreasing rate.9 Secondly, we
assume that the demand for permits is not too convex, in the sense that the semi-
elasticity of permit demand
η(pc) = −e
′
c(pc)
ec(pc)
> 0
27 countries in the European Union.
8In the EU-ETS, free allocation ought to represent at least 95% of total allocation in the first
phase (2005-2008), and at least 90% in the second phase (2008-2012). For an analysis of endogenous
permits allocation, see e.g. Helm (2003) or Godal and Holtsmark (2010). For the EU-ETS, national
allocations plans have been decided at the country level, but in close coordination with the EU
Commission. See Ellerman et al. (2007) for an analysis of the whole procedure. See also the
web site of the European Commission for up-to-date information on National Allocation Plans
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment).
9Rewriting (2) as −c′′(ec) decdpc − 1 = 0, and differentiating it with respect to pc, one gets
−d
2ec
dp2c
C ′′(ec)−
(
dec
dpc
)2
C ′′′(ec) = 0,
and since the first term is negative, the second must be positive, so convexity of the demand amounts
to imposing C ′′′(ec) ≤ 0. Assumptions on third order derivatives are common in the tax competition
literature (Laussel and Le Breton, 1998, Peralta and van Ypersele, 2005).
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is increasing with pc. Notice that when pc increases, ec decreases and (−e′(c)) de-
creases as well. Our assumption of increasing semi-elasticity amounts to say that
the former (first-order) effect dominates the latter. It may also be seen as an upper
bound on the convexity of firm’s permit demand.
2.2 The government
Because the market for tradable permits sets an emission cap in the global economy,
the environmental quality is now exogenous to each country. So national energy taxes
become useless for regulating polluting emissions.10 As discussed in the introduction,
the countries are concerned by the costs borne by the firms; however, excessive concern
for these could bring energy taxation to excessively low levels, which might be a source
of concern given that some countries rely on it as an important source of revenue.
Indeed, the European Commission explicitly recognizes that “Energy taxes (...) have
been used purely as revenue raising instruments, originally without environmental
purposes.” (European Comission, 2012).
Consequently, we shall assume that the objective function of country c regulator
is to maximize a weighted sum of energy tax revenue and permits auction revenue,
net of firms production costs, the latter with a weight of γ > 0. Increasing the energy
tax or the share of permits that are auctioned is revenue raising, but it is costly to the
firms. So the regulator faces a trade-off. For the sake of exposition, let us characterize
two regulator profiles. We shall refer to the case γ > 1 as the firm-oriented regulator
and to the case γ < 1 as the revenue-oriented regulator.11 The regulator of country c
thus sets an energy tax 0 ≤ tc ≤ t¯ so as to maximise
max
tc
Uc = tcec + (1− α)ρe¯c − γ (tcec + ρ(ec − αe¯c) + C(ec)) . (3)
Notice that countries are asymmetric, except if they have the same emission en-
domwent.12
3 Preliminary results
In this section we introduce some preliminary results regarding the functioning of the
TEP market, and the strategic effects of energy taxes in our setting.
10Actually, energy taxes can also be used for other sources of pollution rather than industrial
CO2 consumption (e.g., automobile usage), so they could still serve the purpose of regulating local
pollutants. We are thus making the simplifying assumption that the energy tax base is exclusively
energy consumption by firms.
11The assumption of a double mandate for the regulator is usual in papers dealing with pollution
regulation. For instance, Requate and Unold (2003) assume that the regulator minimizes the sum
of firms’ abatement costs and environmental damage.
12Notice that in the alternative setting without the representative firm, countries are not perfectly
symmetric to the extent that the firms with the same technology do not necessarily have the same
TEP-endowment. All the results go through as long as all the countries have the same total TEP-
endowment. Please refer to Bre´chet and Peralta (2007) for details.
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3.1 Equilibrium in the market for tradable emission permits
Firms are price takers in the international TEP market. Each firm is endowed with
αe¯c emission permits, and the regulator auctions the amount (1−α)e¯c. Total permits
supply in the TEP market is thus
∑N
c=1 e¯c = E¯. Individual firm demand ec(pc) is
implicitly given by (1), hence the permits market clears when
N∑
c=1
ec(pc) =
N∑
c=1
e¯c = E¯ (4)
We show in the Appendix that there is a unique permit price that clears the market
and that it is positive provided that the global emission cap is sufficiently restrictive.
National energy taxes have an impact on the TEP-market because they influence
firms’ energy consumption, and thus pollution. Totally differentiating (4), one obtains
dρ(t, E¯)
dtc
= ρtc = −
e′c(pc)∑N
j=1 e
′
j(pj)
< 0 (5)
The intuition works as follows. If a country increases its tax rate on the energy input,
firms in that country reduce their energy consumption, thus demanding less permits.
Ceteris paribus, the aggregate demand for permits decreases and the equilibrium price
must decrease to clear the market. One should note that
dec
dtc
= e′c(1 + ρtc) = e
′
c
∑
j 6=c e
′
j(pj)∑N
j=1 e
′
j(pj)
< 0
That is, if country c increases it energy tax, the equilibrium price of permits decreases,
but still the cost of energy increases and the firms in that country pollute less. But
as a consequence, the lower permit price leads to an increase in the emission level in
all other countries in the economy, that is:
dec
dtj
= e′cρtj > 0, j 6= c
This means that every country potentially has some market power in the market
for TEPs. It should be noticed that (5) can be rewritten as
ρtc = −
ηcec∑N
j=1 ηjej
,
from which it is clear that the impact of a given country’s energy tax rate on the
TEP price is greater the greater is that country’s firm’s demand for permits, on
the one hand, and the (semi-)elasticity of this demand, on the other hand. If the
representative firm reacts strongly to the increase in the energy cost, the country has
a stronger market power. In the following subsection these effects will be further
analyzed, and we will show how they interact in equilibrium.
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3.2 The strategic effects of energy taxation
We solve for a Nash equilibrium in energy taxes. The regulator in country c chooses tc
so as to maximize its payoff defined by (3). Notice that each regulator’s payoff depends
on the tax choice of the other regulators via the permits price in equilibrium.
The first-order condition for the regulator’s problem (3) in country c writes as
follows
(1− γ)ec(pc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax base effect
+ tc
dec(pc)
dtc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Permit-leakage effect
− ρtc (γ(ec(pc)− αe¯c)− (1− α)e¯c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Terms of trade effect
= 0 (6)
The above expression identifies the determinants of tax setting by each country.
As usual in tax competition games with terms-of-trade effects, the conditions for the
quasi-concavity of the payoff functions are cumbersome (see, e.g., Peralta and van
Ypersele, 2005). Throughout the paper we are going to assume that (at least one)
Nash equilibrium exists with tax rates defined by (6). There exists at least one class
of cost functions (the quadratic one) which respects convexity of the abatement cost
and increasing semi-elasticity of the TEP-demand where the unique Nash equilibrium
is given by (6).13
The first-order condition (6) identifies three key equilibrium effects.
The tax base effect: the larger the energy consumption by the firm in country c,
the higher the country’s incentive to tax (as long as γ < 1). This is weighted down
by γ, for an increase in the energy tax rate increases firms’ cost. The tax base effect
becomes negative for γ > 1, i.e. when the regulator gives more weight to firm’s costs
than to fiscal revenue.
The permits leakage effect: provided that the tax base decreases with the tax
rate, taxation is discouraged when the tax rate is positive, and encouraged otherwise.
The magnitude of this effect depends on the country’s market power. To see this,
notice that
dec(pc)
dtc
= (1 + ρtc) e
′
c(pc)
Hence, a higher market power lowers the sensitivity of the tax base to the tax rate,
for the TEP price absorbs a greater share of the tax increase. The tax base and
permit-leakage effect actually sum up to a Laffer curve, modified by (1− γ).
The terms of trade effect: this effect stems from the fact that the TEP price
decreases with the country’s tax rate. When the representative firm buys emission
permits (i.e. when it pollutes more than its endowment), and when the share of grand-
fathering increases (i.e. a decrease in 1−α), then the regulator benefits from a lower ρ
13In order to ensure concavity of the payoff functions in the quadratic case, one needs to assume
further that γ < 2NN−1 . Details available from the authors, upon request.
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and has thus a higher incentive to tax. We shall refer to (γ(ec(pc)− αe¯c)− (1− α)e¯c)
as the perceived importing position of country c in the market for permits. When
γ = 1, the regulator is a perfect agent of the firm, and the perceived importing po-
sition is equal to the actual one, i.e., ec(pc) − e¯c. When the regulator only cares for
tax revenue, then it acts de facto as a permit exporter, i.e., it has an interest to raise
the permit price.14
It is also interesting to check how grandfathering changes the perceived permit
import. When all permits are auctioned (with α = 0), the perceived importing posi-
tion is equal to γec(pc) − e¯c, while with total grandfathering (α = 1), it is given by
γ(ec(pc) − e¯c). Hence, for a revenue-oriented (resp., firm-oriented) regulator, grand-
fathering increases (resp., decreases) the perceived importing position of a country.
Grandfathering is thus an incentive to tax for a revenue-oriented and a disincentive
to tax for a firm-oriented regulator. Giving more TEP to the firm for free decreases
the firm’s importing position but it also increases the country’s supply of permits
to auction in the market, the former carrying a weight of γ. Hence, the perceived
importing position decreases only when γ > 1.
Straightforward manipulation of (6) defines implicitly the Nash equilibrium energy
tax of country c as
tˆc =
(1− γ)eˆc(pc)− ρˆtc (γ(eˆc(pˆc)− αe¯c)− (1− α)e¯c)
−(1 + ρˆtc)eˆ′c(pˆc)
(7)
Where xˆ denotes the equilibrium value of the variable x.
4 The emission cap, the number of countries, and
energy taxes
We now study the impact of the fundamentals of the TEP-market on energy taxes.
In order to do so, we focus on symmetric countries, i.e., we let e¯c = e¯ = E¯/N, ∀c. We
shall relax this assumption later. In this case it turns out that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium where all countries set the same tax rate in equilibrium. With equal tax
rates, energy prices are the same across countries, and so is energy consumption.
Equilibrium in the permit market then yields eˆc = eˆ = E¯/N = e¯, ∀c. Given the
symmetry of tax bases, we have that ρˆtc = 1/N . Let ηˆ be the semi-elasticity of TEP-
demand evaluated at pˆc = pˆ, ∀c which respects ec(pˆ) = E¯/N, ∀c. Straightforward
simplification of (6) thus yields
tˆc = tˆ =
1
ηˆ
(1− γ)1−
1−α
N
1− 1
N
(8)
Obviously, in the symmetric equilibrium the representative firm in each country con-
sumes exactly the TEP-endowment of the country. However, the perceived importing
14A similar argument is found in the capital tax competition literature. See De Pater and Myers
(1994) and Peralta and van Ypersele (2005).
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position of each country is equal to e¯ ((α− 1)(1− γ)), which is equal to zero only when
no permits are auctioned (α = 1). With (however small) auctioning, the regulator
perceives an exporting position when γ < 1, and an importing position otherwise.
Indeed, when there is auctioning and the regulator is revenue-oriented, it gives a
higher weight to permits endowment than to permits consumption, hence it behaves
as an exporter. Conversely, a firm-oriented regulator (γ > 1) gives a higher weight to
permits consumption, so it behaves as if permits were imported in equilibrium. Note
also that the perceived importing or exporting positions of the regulators are both
increasing in α, since giving more
We can now state our first result in the following proposition, which relates grand-
fathering and the regulator’s mandate to energy taxation.
Proposition 1 In the symmetric equilibrium,
(i) ‘firm-oriented regulators’ subsidize energy, and the subsidy is increasing in the
share of grandfathering,
(ii) ‘revenue-oriented regulators’ tax energy, and the tax raises with the share of
grandfathering;
(iii) the permit price increases in the former case, and decreases in the latter case,
with the share of grandfathering.
Proof. Straightforward derivation of (8), together with the fact that ρ is decreasing
in tax rates. Also, it is obvious that when γ > 1, tˆ < 0.
The relative importance of each of the regulator’s double mandate has a clear
implication: when firm’s costs are more important than fiscal and auction revenue,
countries subsidize energy consumption, otherwise they tax it. Grandfathering creates
incentive for further distortion: increasing subsidies or taxes, depending on whether
regulators are firm- or revenue-oriented. This stems from the changed perceived
importing position of the country as discussed in Subsection 3.2 above. Through its
strategic effect on energy taxation, grandfathering also has an impact on the permit
price. This is in contrast to the usual result in the literature that under perfect
competition and in a static setting, the market outcome is independent of permits
allocation.
We now turn to explore the effects of two main features related to the design of
markets for TEPs: a change in the emission cap, and an enlargement of the market
to new comers.
4.1 Changing the emission cap
A fundamental feature of the TEP-market is the fact that a global emission cap is
assigned to the economy. The conventional wisdom about cap-and-trade markets is
that a strengthening of the global emission cap unambiguously leads to an increase
in the permit price. As a consequence, the energy costs for firms should also increase.
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Does this still hold under strategic taxation? The following proposition addresses this
question.
Proposition 2 Strengthening the global emission cap always increases the energy
cost, but not necessarily the permit price. In fact,
(i) if the regulators are ‘revenue-oriented’, then energy taxes decrease and the permit
price increases,
(ii) if the regulators are ‘firm-oriented’, then energy subsidies decrease and the effect
on permit price is ambiguous,
(iii) when grandfathering increases, both effects are amplified.
Proof. Given that each firm consumes E¯/N , decreasing this value must be accom-
panied by an increase in the regulated cost of energy, by (1). The assumption that
ηc(pc) is increasing in pc ensures that taxes decrease if they are positive, and increase
otherwise. Since pˆ = 1 + ρˆ + tˆ, when taxes increase, pˆ can increase only if ρˆ in-
creases. Straightforward derivation of (8) shows that when α increases, equilibrium
taxes depend more on the tax base.
This Proposition partially explains the evidence in Figure 1, which shows that
the average tax level follows the total number of permits traded in the market. This
evidence should be taken with caution, given the relatively short period that elapsed
after the implementation of the EU-ETS.
When the emission cap becomes more stringent, firms in each country consume
less permits in equilibrium, so its price must increase. Given that the semi-elasticity
of permit demand is increasing, the permit demand is now more sensitive to tax
changes, hence taxation (or subsidisation, when γ > 1) of energy is discouraged via
the permit-leakage effect. When tax rates are positive, the permit price increases
over and above what it would without strategic energy taxation: our setup entails an
amplification of the effect of permit supply on its price. The effect of grandfathering is
a result of its impact on the perceived importing position of the country: it discourages
taxation for firm-oriented regulators and encourages taxation (i.e., lower subsidies)
for firm-oriented ones.
4.2 Adding new countries
Let us now turn to an enlargement of the TEP-market. This is not a mere abstraction
in our setting, since we are dealing with a market which is implemented amongst a set
of countries and, logically countries outside this market may decide to join at some
point. This actually happened with the ETS on the occasion of the EU enlargement.
We neutralize the tax base effect by supposing that each new country receives exactly
the TEP-endowment of the existing ones. Naturally, if the countries’ TEP-endowment
decreases, one may apply a two-step reasoning whereby, firstly, new countries join the
market and then the market becomes more stringent, as analyzed in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 3 Suppose the number of countries increases and each country’s permit
endowment is kept constant. Then, the energy cost does not change, but the following
holds:
(i) if the regulator is ‘revenue-oriented’, energy taxes decrease and the permit price
increases,
(ii) if the regulator is ‘firm-oriented’, energy subsidies decrease and the permit price
decreases,
(iii) increasing grandfathering leads to a smaller variation in taxes and permit price
and, with full auctioning, the number of countries does not impact energy taxes
and permit price.
Proof. Straightforward derivation of (8) shows that
dtˆ
dN
≤ 0 whenever γ ≤ 1. Since
firm’s energy consumption does not change, the regulated cost of energy must be kept
constant, by (1). The fact that pˆ = 1 + ρˆ + tˆ implies that ρˆ varies in the opposite
direction of tˆ. Finally, letting α = 0, (8) boils down to
tˆ =
1
ηˆ
(1− γ)
which does not depend on N .
In order to understand this result, let us look at the two extreme cases of full
grandfathering and no grandfathering. When all permits are given to the firms for
free (α = 1), the perceived importing position is equal to zero, and the only effect of
increasing N stems from the fact that the weight of each country on the international
TEP market decreases, hence the permit-leakage effect becomes stronger because the
TEP price absorbs a smaller proportion of tax increases. Indeed, in the symmetric
equilibrium we have that
deˆc
dpˆc
= e′c
(
1− 1
N
)
.
Hence, countries optimally respond by taxing (or subsidizing) less because their tax
bases are more responsive to their tax choices.
Now let us look at the case where all permits are auctioned (α = 0). The permit-
leakage effect is still the same. Tax revenue increases by 1, the direct impact of the
tax, and auction revenue decreases by −1/N , because ρ decreases. On the other hand,
the firm’s cost increases by 1, the direct impact of the tax, and decreases by −1/N
because ρ decreases and so does TEP cost. Hence, the effect of the tax increase is
everywhere proportional to 1− (1/N) and the market power of the country no longer
matters.
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5 The creation of the TEP market
Having understood the interplay between TEP-markets and energy taxation, we now
turn to the analysis of the likely effects of introducing a TEP-market on a previously
unregulated economy. In the absence of a TEP-market, the optimal energy consump-
tion by the firms is implicitly given by −C ′f (ec) = 1 + tc. Countries maximize (3),
with ρ = e¯c = 0. Their first-order condition is then
(1− γ)ec(tc) + tcdec(tc)
dtc
= 0. (9)
Using the fact that, in the absence of the TEP-market, dec/dtc = dec/dpc = e
′
c,
the autarkic energy tax tac is thus given by
tac = t
a = (1− γ) 1
ηa
, (10)
where ηa denotes the semi-elasticity of permit demand when the price of energy is
given by (1 + ta).
Let us now assume that a non-constraining TEP-market enters into force. By
‘non-constraining’ we mean that each country is endowed with a number of permits
equal to its firm’s emissions in the absence of permits market. One could expect no
changes in the economy, because the emission cap is non-binding. In fact, even this
neutral form of emission market will change energy taxation, just because introducing
the market creates mobility of the tax base (which is immobile under autarky). This
result is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose a non-constraining TEP-market is introduced.Then, the en-
ergy cost remains constant but the following effects occur:
(i) ‘revenue-oriented’ regulators increase their energy tax, whereas ‘firm-oriented’ reg-
ulators increase their energy subsidy,
(ii) increasing the share of grandfathering amplifies the above effects,
(iii) with full auctioning, energy taxes remain unchanged.
Proof. Using (8) and (10), and the fact that the market is non constraining, it is
straightforward to obtain tˆ
ta
= (1− 1−α
N
)/(1− 1
N
) ≥ 1, which is equal to 1 when α = 0.
The preliminary evidence on Figure 1 suggests that the tax level has increased with
the introduction of the EU-ETS in 2005, confirming the result in this proposition.15
Introducing a non-constraining TEP-market keeps the tax base at the same level.
However, the responsiveness of the tax base to the tax rate declines, thanks to the
15Indeed, the average tax level before (resp., after) the introduction of EU-ETS is 177.9 (resp.,
194.16) and the the two values are significantly different at the 1% confidence level. Again, this
preliminary evidence is to be taken cautiously, given the very short number of observations.
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partial absorption of the tax increase by the TEP-price. In other words, the cost
of energy varies one-to-one with the tax rate in autarky, while it varies less under a
TEP-market. This leads countries to increase their taxes (or subsidies). The so-called
run to the bottom result of the tax competition literature is sometimes interpreted
as a decrease in the tax rate when borders are open, i.e., when the tax base becomes
mobile. Proposition 4 shows that the exact opposite happens in our setting with
revenue-oriented regulators.
As auctioning permits is a disincentive to tax, the tax increase following the
introduction of the market is greater when grandfathering is more important. In the
absence of grandfathering, we already know from Proposition 3 that the market power
of the country does not matter for tax setting, hence the introduction of the market
does not change energy taxes.
6 Asymmetric permit endowments
In this last section we shall relax the assumption of symmetric permit endowments
to grasp the effects of permits allocation on energy taxes in a general way. This will
allow us to obtain two more results, the first related to country taxation, the second
related to the efficiency of the TEP-market.
6.1 Permit endowments and energy taxes
Let us pick up two countries from the economy, denoted by ‘A’ and ‘B’.
Proposition 5 If the permit endowment of firms in country A is lower than in coun-
try B, and if taxes are strategic complements, then country A sets a higher tax than
country B. Moreover, a TEP-importing country sets a higher energy tax than a TEP-
exporting one.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 rests on the terms of trade effect, which is an
incentive to tax for a (perceived) importer, and a disincentive to tax for a (perceived)
exporter. Since the country with the small endowment will (at a given tax rate) either
import more, or export less, it has an incentive to set a higher tax rate.
According to Proposition 5, countries ranking in terms of energy taxes is the
inverse of the ranking in permit endowments. Following the same token as above, we
can also answer a closely related question, namely, how does the equilibrium change if
we switch the endowments of two different countries? The following corollary provides
the answer.
Corollary 1 Suppose a reallocation of TEP endowments such that country A gets
more permits and country B less, the total amount being kept unchanged. Then the
energy tax decreases in country A and increases in country B, if taxes are strategic
complements.
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6.2 Cost-inefficiency of the market for tradable permits
In setting up a market for permits, the aim is to curb pollution in a cost-efficient way.
This property of TEPs is widely put forward in the literature (since Montgomery,
1972) and generally used as an argument by its advocates (see e.g. IEA, 2006). This
property, stated without strategic fiscal interactions, is questioned in our much more
realistic setting.
The allocation of pollution emission is cost-efficient if, for a given quantity of
aggregate pollution, the aggregate emission abatement cost is minimized. Formally,
a cost-efficient pollution abatement is the solution of the following problem
min
{e1,...,eN}
N∑
c=1
C(ec) s.t.
N∑
c=1
ec = E¯.
Hence, cost-efficiency is attained when C ′(ec) = κ , ∀c, where κ is a finite negative
number. We show that, in the case of an international market with fiscal spillovers,
this property does not hold anymore.16 Proposition 5 shows that energy taxes generi-
cally differ when countries have different permit endowments. Then follows Corollary
2.
Corollary 2 When countries set energy taxes non-cooperatively, equilibrium taxes
are generically different. Hence, an international market for tradable emission per-
mits is not cost-efficient.
This result shows that the efficiency gains of introducing a market are not re-
alized if the power to tax energy inputs is left to the national initiative. This is a
worrisome result, in that, as stressed in the introduction, empirical evidence confirms
strong cross-country differences in energy taxation, which may be taken as evidence
of asymmetries amongst firms locating in each country. This asymmetry will likely
lead countries to set different taxes under the international TEP-market. Moreover,
the relative importance of energy tax revenue in some countries makes it unlikely that
all countries would be ready to give up their fiscal autonomy in this matter. Indeed,
early attempts to coordinate carbon taxes in the European Union have been blocked
by political reasons (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009).
What does this result imply for the desirability of a TEP-market? There is one
obvious way to overcome the inefficiency: adjust TEP endowment in such a way that
countries set the same energy tax. In a setting of symmetric countries, this amounts
to symmetric TEP endowments. In a more general setting where firms have different
abatement cost curves, it suffices to endow each country with the exact TEP demand
of its firm or firms, in a way that makes the perceived net importing position equal
across countries. A related question is whether the TEP-market improves upon the
autarkic situation. Naturally, if the environmental damage is taken into account, and
there is over-pollution in autarky, then one may argue that it is better to achieve a
16Indeed, suppose that there are no energy taxes, i.e., tc = 0 in all countries. Then the choice of
the energy input by the firms is such that −C ′(ec) = 1 + ρ and cost-efficiency is achieved.
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reduction in pollution, even if not in a cost effective manner. This is not, however,
the case in our setting. If one introduces a non-constraining market, as in Proposition
4, and if we allow the TEP-endowments to differ across countries, as in Proposition
5, then the abatement costs become asymmetric across countries. Indeed, the effect
of introducing a market with asymmetric endowments is to introduce asymmetry in
a previously symmetric world where marginal abatement costs were equated via tax-
regulations. While this last result is arguably particular to our setting, the previous
one that adjusting the allocation of permits across countries can be used to achieve
efficiency (or, at least, decrease inefficiency) carries through to an asymmetric country
setting.
It is important to notice that country asymmetry per se does not imply asymmetric
taxation, rather it is the non-cooperative behavior that does so. If countries were to
cooperate to minimize total abatement cost they would set equal tax rates.
7 Conclusion
With the background of the establishment of several environmental agreements at
the international level we analyze the interaction between an international market for
tradable polluting permits and national energy taxes. Because the market for trad-
able emission permits introduces a mobile tax base between countries (the polluting
permits themselves), it creates room for fiscal competition.
We suppose that each country delegates energy tax choices to a national regular
with the double mandate of obtaining fiscal and auction revenue, on the one hand,
while not jeopardizing the representative firm’s competitiveness, on the other hand.
That is, it maximizes a weighted sum of fiscal and auction revenue and (the negative
of) firm’s costs, and we keep our analysis general enough that the regulator may
attach a higher weight to either one. Our analysis highlights the effects that drive tax
choices: the tax base, the permit leakage and the terms of trade effects. The analysis
of the interplay between these effects allows us to characterize how equilibrium energy
taxes depend on the TEP-market design, i.e. the total amount of permits issued, the
number of countries which join the market, the allocation of permits across countries,
and the share of this endowment which is given to the firms (grandfathering) instead
of auctioned. We also look at the impact of introducing the market on a previously
autarkic world.
Revenue-oriented (i.e., attaching a higher weight to the fiscal and auction revenue)
regulators tax energy, while firm-oriented regulators subsidize energy. We show that
the effect on taxes depends on the relative importance of the two mandates to the
regulator. Increasing the restrictiveness of the market (i.e. decreasing the emission
cap) leads lower energy taxes or lower energy subsidies, depending on the dominant
mandate of the regulator. The same effect is obtained by adding new countries
without increasing the stringency of the emission cap. The introduction of the market
has the opposite effect on energy taxation, i.e., countries increase their energy taxes or
their subsidies, because the TEP price partially absorbs tax increases, thus decreasing
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the permit leakage effect. Introducing asymmetry in the allocation of permits across
countries, we are able to show that the permit-richest country sets a lower energy
tax. Interestingly, the very preliminary evidence regarding energy taxation and the
introduction of the EU-ETS market can be explained by our results.
The way in which the permits are allocated to the firms – i.e., auctioned or grandfa-
thered – changes the incentives to tax or subsidize. In a nutshell, more grandfathering
decreases the importing position of the firms and decreases the exporting position of
the country in the permit market. A firm-oriented regulator attaches more impor-
tance to the former effect, while a revenue-oriented one attaches more importance to
the latter. Hence, increased grandfathering decreases the perceived importing posi-
tion of a firm-oriented regulator, thus discouraging taxation, and increases that of a
revenue-oriented regulator, thus encouraging taxation (i.e., decreasing the subsidy).
Considering strategic taxation leads us to question one common argument in favor
of tradable permits, namely, that it achieves emission reduction in a cost-efficient way.
We have shown that TEP-markets are cost effective only if they are accompanied by
a tax harmonization policy. Another widely accepted result of perfectly competitive
TEP markets which does not hold in our setup is that the way in which the permits are
allocated is neutral with respect to the market outcomes. Given that the regulators
attach different weights to the representative firm’s production costs and fiscal and
auction revenue, whether one permit is auctioned or given away to the firm for free
changes the incentives to tax energy and thus the equilibrium in the permit market.
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Appendix
The following lemma states the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique permit price ρ(t, E¯) that clears the market. Fur-
thermore, assuming that E¯ <
∑N
c=1 ec(1 + t¯), the equilibrium permit price is strictly
positive.
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall the equilibrium condition on the market for TEPs
(4). Since the left-hand side of (4) is strictly decreasing in ρ, for each tax vector
t = {t1, . . . tN}, and the global permits supply E¯ being given, there exists a unique
permit price ρ(t, E¯) satisfying (4). To see that ρ(t, E¯) > 0, notice that
dρ(t, E¯)
dtc
= ρtc = −
e′c(pc)∑N
j=1 e
′
j(pj)
< 0 (11)
hence the lowest equilibrium ρ(t, E¯) arises when tc = t¯, ∀c. This fact, together with
the assumption that
∑N
c=1 ec(t¯) > E¯ ensures ρ(t, E¯) > 0 when tc = t¯, ∀c, hence it
must also be positive for any other possible tax vector.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) For any two countries a and b and taking the set tˆi/∈{a,b} =
{
tˆi, i /∈ {a, b}
}
as
given, we may rewrite (6) for countries a and b
Φ(tˆa, e¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = (1− γ)eˆa + tˆaeˆ′a(1 + ρˆta)− ρˆta (γ(eˆa − αe¯a)− (1− α)e¯a) = 0
Φ(tˆb, e¯b, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = (1− γ)eˆb + tˆbeˆ′b(1 + ρˆtb)− ρˆtb (γ(eˆb − αe¯b)− (1− α)e¯b) = 0
Now take e¯a < e¯b, and suppose that tˆa < tˆb. Then, we have that eˆa > eˆb
and, by definition of the Nash Equilibrium,Φ(tˆa, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0. Now using,
successively, concavity of the payoff functions, strategic complementarity, and,
lastly, the fact that ∂Φ(·)/∂e¯c < 0 we may write
0 = Φ(tˆa, e¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) > Φ(tˆb, e¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) >
Φ(tˆb, e¯a, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) > Φ(tˆb, e¯b, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0
And a contradiction is reached.
21
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2012/15. Dirk VAN DE GAER, Joost VANDENBOSSCHE and José Luis FIGUEROA. Children's 
health opportunities and project evaluation: Mexico's Oportunidades program. 
2012/16. Giacomo VALLETTA. Health, fairness and taxation. 
2012/17. Chiara CANTA and Pierre PESTIEAU. Long term care insurance and family norms. 
2012/18. David DE LA CROIX and Fabio MARIANI. From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified 
theory of marriage institutions. 
2012/19. Carl GAIGNE, Stéphane RIOU and Jacques-François THISSE. Are compact cities 
environmentally friendly? 
2012/20. Jean-François CARPANTIER and Besik SAMKHARADZE. The asymmetric commodity 
inventory effect on the optimal hedge ratio. 
2012/21. Concetta MENDOLICCHIO, Dimitri PAOLINI and Tito PIETRA. Asymmetric information 
and overeducation. 
2012/22. Tom TRUYTS. Stochastic signaling: Information substitutes and complements. 
2012/23. Pierre DEHEZ and Samuel FEREY. How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach. 
2012/24. Pilar GARCIA-GOMEZ, Erik SCHOKKAERT, Tom VAN OURTI and Teresa BAGO D'UVA. 
Inequity in the face of death. 
2012/25. Christian HAEDO and Michel MOUCHART. A stochastic independence approach for different 
measures of concentration and specialization. 
2012/26. Xavier RAMOS and Dirk VAN DE GAER. Empirical approaches to inequality of opportunity: 
principles, measures, and evidence. 
2012/27. Jacques H. DRÈZE and Erik SCHOKKAERT. Arrow's theorem of the deductible : moral 
hazard and stop-loss in health insurance. 
2012/28 Luc BAUWENS and Giuseppe STORTI. Computationally efficient inference procedures for 
vast dimensional realized covariance models. 
2012/29. Pierre DEHEZ. Incomplete-markets economies: The seminar work of Diamond, Drèze and 
Radner. 
2012/30 Helmuth CREMER, Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIÈRE. The economics of long-
term care: a survey. 
2012/31 Mathieu VAN VYVE, Laurence A. WOLSEY and Hande YAMAN. Relaxations for two-level 
multi-item lot-sizing problem. 
2012/32 Jean-François MERTENS and Anna RUBINCHIK. Equilibria in an overlapping generations 
model with transfer policies and exogenous growth. 
2012/33 Jean-François MERTENS and Anna RUBINCHIK. Pareto optimality of the golden rule 
equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with production and transfers. 
2012/34 Hélène LATZER and Florian MAYNERIS. Income distribution and vertical comparative 
advantage. Theory and evidence. 
2012/35 Pascal MOSSAY and Takatoshi TABUCHI. Preferential trade agreements harm third countries. 
2012/36 Aitor CALO-BLANCO. The compensation problem with fresh starts. 
2012/37 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Arnaud DUFAYS. Commodities volatility and the theory of 
storage. 
2012/38 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Christelle SAPATA. Unfair inequalities in France: A 
regional comparison. 
2012/39 Shui-Ki WAN, Shin-Huei WANG and Chi-Keung WOO. Total tourist arrival forecast: 
aggregation vs. disaggregation. 
2012/40 Thierry BRECHET, Yann MENIERE and Pierre M. PICARD. The clean development 
mechanism in a global carbon market. 
2012/41 Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES, Vicente ORTS and José J. 
SEMPERE-MONERRIS. Theoretical and experimental insights on firms' internationalization 
decisions under uncertainty. 
2012/42 Berardino CESI and Dimitri PAOLINI. Peer group and distance: when widening university 
participation is better. 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2012/43 Arnaud DUFAYS. Infinite-state Markov-switching for dynamic volatility and correlation 
models. 
2012/44 Miguel JARA, Dimitri PAOLINI and J.D. TENA. Management efficiency in football: An 
empirical analysis of two extreme cases. 
2012/45 Guillaume ROELS, Philippe CHEVALIER and Ying WEI. United we stand? Coordinating 
capacity investment and allocation in joint ventures. 
2012/46 Mikel BEDAYO, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Bargaining and delay in 
trading networks. 
2012/47 Pierre M. PICARD and Ridwan D. RUSLI. State owned firms: Private debt, cost revelation and 
welfare. 
2012/48 Shin-Huei WANG, Luc BAUWENS and Cheng HSIAO. Forecasting long memory processes 
subject to structural breaks. 
2012/49 Thierry BRECHET, Carmen CAMACHO and Vladimir M. VELIOV. Adaptive model-
predictive climate policies in a multi-country setting. 
2012/50 Vladyslav NORA and Hiroshi UNO. Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria. 
2012/51 Thomas BAUDIN, David DE LA CROIX and Paula GOBBI. DINKs, DEWKs & Co. Marriage, 
fertility and childlessness in the United States. 
2012/52 David DE LA CROIX and Omar LICANDRO. The longevity of famous people from 
Hammurabi to Einstein. 
2012/53 Marijn VERSCHELDE, Jean HINDRIKS, Glenn RAYP and Koen SCHOORS. School staff 
autonomy and educational performance: within school type evidence. 
2012/54 Thierry BRECHET and Susana PERALTA. Markets for tradable emission permits with fiscal 
competition. 
 
Books 
 
G. DURANTON, Ph. MARTIN, Th. MAYER and F. MAYNERIS (2010), The economics of clusters – 
Lessons from the French experience. Oxford University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and I. VAN DE CLOOT (2011), Notre pension en heritage. Itinera Institute. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2011), A theory of fairness and social welfare. Cambridge University 
Press. 
V. GINSBURGH and S. WEBER (2011), How many languages make sense? The economics of linguistic 
diversity. Princeton University Press. 
I. THOMAS, D. VANNESTE and X. QUERRIAU (2011), Atlas de Belgique – Tome 4 Habitat. Academia 
Press. 
W. GAERTNER and E. SCHOKKAERT (2012), Empirical social choice. Cambridge University Press. 
L. BAUWENS, Ch. HAFNER and S. LAURENT (2012), Handbook of volatility models and their 
applications. Wiley. 
J-C. PRAGER and J. THISSE (2012), Economic geography and the unequal development of regions. 
Routledge. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2012), Equality of opportunity: the economics of responsibility. 
World Scientific. 
J. HINDRIKS (2012), Gestion publique. De Boeck. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 
A. SHAPIRO (2010), Stochastic programming: modeling and theory. 
